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FOURTH AMENDMENT-DETERMINING
THE REASONABLE LENGTH OF A
TERRY STOP
United States v. Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. 1568 (1985).
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Sharpe,1 the Supreme Court considered
whether a police officer violated an individual's fourth amendment
rights when the officer detained the suspect without probable cause
for arrest.2 The Court held that the seizure of respondent Donald
Savage was constitutionally valid because law enforcement officials
diligently pursued a viable means of investigation to dispel their rea-
sonable suspicion that the respondent was involved in illegal drug
trafficking.3 In reaching its decision, the majority in Sharpe estab-
lished a "diligence test" to determine if, in the absence of probable
cause, the duration of the seizure was sufficiently limited in scope so
as not to constitute an illegal defacto arrest.4
This note will examine the Supreme Court's reasoning in Sharpe
and will distinguish the two tests that the majority and Justice Mar-
shall, in his separate concurrence, advocate for determining the
proper time limit of non-probable cause seizures. 5 This note will
then assess which test is more appropriate in light of the Supreme




In interpreting the fourth amendment's prohibition against un-
1 105 S. Ct. 1568 (1985).
2 Id. The text of the fourth amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3 United States v. Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1576 (1985).
4 Id. at 1575. See infra, text accompanying notes 109-10.
5 See infra text accompanying notes 150-63.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 163-76.
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reasonable searches and seizures, the Supreme Court has under-
gone two distinct phases. Prior to 1968, the Supreme Court held
that only those searches and seizures based on probable cause were
reasonable. 7 The Supreme Court construed probable cause to be
"more than bare suspicion."8  In Carroll v. United States,9 the
Supreme Court concluded that probable cause exists if the facts are
such that a reasonable man would believe that a suspect is commit-
ting or has committed an offense. 10 In the landmark case of Terry v.
Ohio, 1 however, the Supreme Court decided that, in certain circum-
stances, probable cause was not a prerequisite for constitutionally
valid searches. 12
A. TERRY V. OHIO
In Terry, a police officer frisked two men whom he suspected of
"casing" a store and possibly carrying weapons.' 3 The officer un-
7 See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); see also Henry v. United States,
361 U.S. 98 (1959).
8 Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175. In Brinegar, federal agents stopped the petitioner's car
and interrogated him. The petitioner admitted that he possessed twelve cases of liquor,
which the agents subsequently seized. Upon conviction on charges of illegally trans-
porting liquor, the petitioner claimed that the agents had violated his fourth amendment
rights. Relying heavily on Carroll V. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), the Supreme
Court held that the federal agents possessed probable cause when they stopped the
petitioner. Id. at 177-78. The Court emphasized the following facts: one of the agents
had arrested the petitioner five months earlier on similar charges, the agent had ob-
served the petitioner loading large quantities of liquor into a vehicle on previous occa-
sions, and the vehicle was travelling in the vicinity ofJoplin, Missouri, a known supply
source of liquor for Oklahoma (which at the time was a "dry" state). Id. 167-70. See
generally Armentano, The Standards for Probable Cause Under the Fourth Amendment, 44 CoNN.
LJ. 137 (1970).
9 267 U.S. 132 (1925). In Carroll, federal prohibition agents stopped the petitioner's
carjust outside Grands Rapids, Michigan. Upon searching the vehicle the agents discov-
ered 68 bottles containing whiskey and gin. Several months earlier, the agents had un-
successfully attempted to purchase liquor from the petitioner in an attempt to uncover
evidence of illegal alcohol trafficking. Acknowledging the agents' previous encounters
with the petitioner along with the fact that the petitioner was travelling in the vicinity of
Detroit, which was an active center for liquor smuggling, the court held that the agents
possessed probable cause when they searched the petitioner's vehicle. Id. at 160. As
such, the Court upheld the petitioner's conviction on drug smuggling charges. Id. at
162.
10 Id. at 161-62.
11 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
12 Id.
13 Officer McFadden, a policeman who had patrolled the same area for thirty years,
observed two men acting suspiciously. The two alternately passed in front of a store
window approximately twenty-four times. Eventually, the two suspects joined a third
individual several blocks away from the store. Officer McFadden approached the three
individuals and asked their names. After the suspects responded with only a mumbled
reply, Officer McFadden turned petitioner around and frisked his outer clothing. Of-
ficer McFadden subsequently frisked the other suspects. Id. at 5-8.
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covered two revolvers during his brief search. 14 The majority in
Terry held that a police officer with only reasonable suspicion of crimi-
nal activity had the right to stop and briefly frisk a suspect's outer
clothing.' 5
In coming to its decision, the Terry majority introduced a two
pronged test to determine whether a search based on reasonable
suspicion is constitutionally valid.16 Courts must first decide
whether the police initially had the right to carry out the search
and/or seizure.' 7 Then, courts must determine if the intrusion was
"reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place."' 18 The Teny majority applied a bal-
ancing test to determine whether Officer McFadden was initiallyjus-
tified in frisking petitioner Terry.' 9 The majority stated that the
government's interest in police safety outweighed the limited intru-
sion on the suspect's fourth amendment rights.20 Therefore, the
Court held that the police action was initially justified.
The majority, however, gave very few guidelines for determin-
ing the proper scope of a police detention without probable cause.
Instead, the majority narrowly analyzed the facts in Terry. Because
safety concerns initially justified the brief search of the suspect, the
majority found that Officer McFadden's actions were sufficiently
limited in scope, as they were directed toward the discovery of
weapons and not toward the discovery of other incriminating evi-
dence.2 1 The majority did state, however, that a police intrusion
pursuant to reasonable suspicion must not reach the level of intru-
siveness of an arrest. 22
14 Id. at 7.
15 Id. at 30-31.
16 Id. at 20.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 20-21. The Terry majority relied on the Supreme Court's previous decision
in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), to justify its use of the balancing
test. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. In Camara, the Supreme Court considered whether a San
Francisco resident had the right to deny city housing inspectors access to his dwelling if
those inspectors did not possess a warrant. Camara, 387 U.S. at 27-28. The Court held
that according to the facts of the case city inspectors did need a warrant. Id. at 533-34.
However, the Courts also said that in order to obtain a warrant city inspectors did not
need to possess the level of probable cause traditionally mandated by courts. Id. at 539.
Realizing that safety inspections are the most effective means to enforce adherence to
municipal codes, the Court stated: "If a valid public interest justifies the intrusion con-
templated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted warrant." Id.
20 Terry, 392 U.S. at 23-24.
21 Id. at 29-30.




Subsequent to Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court has applied the
reasonable suspicion standard to seizures, 23 as well as, searches.
The Court affirmed that so-called "Terry stops," i.e., seizures based
only on reasonable suspicion, were permissible under the fourth
amendment. 24 Although the Supreme Court rendered a number of
decisions concerning Tery stops, the majority of these cases fo-
cussed on whether police were initially justified in making the stop
and not on the scope of the stop.25 Nevertheless, since Terry, the
Supreme Court has stated in several decisions that Terry stops be
brief.2 6 In addition, the Court has continually emphasized the Terry
caveat that detentions lacking probable cause must be substantially
less intrusive than arrests. 27
In United States v. Place,28 the Supreme Court, for the first time,
extensively considered the time limitations of a Terry stop. In Place,
two Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents seized a sus-
pected drug courier's suitcase and subjected it to a sniff test by a
23 "A person is 'seized' only when, by means of physical force or a show of authority,
his freedom of movement is restrained." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,
553 (1979). Note that the Court in Terry stated that "not all personal intercourse be-
tween policeman and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons." Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n. 16.
See generally Williamson, The Dimensions of Seizure: The Concepts of "Stop" and "Arrest", 43
OHIO ST. L.J. 771 (1982).
24 See, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
25 See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (whether Terry stops are
permissible to detect the transport of illegal aliens): Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648
(1979) (whether an automobile Terry stop is permissible if the law enforcement officials
possess no evidence of an equipment or traffic violation but merely want to check the
driver's license and car registration); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981)
(whether a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause carries with it
the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491 (1983) (whether Terry stops are permissible to detect illegal trafficking in narcotics).
26 See, e.g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). In Adams, the court stated, "A
brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his [the suspect's] indentity or
maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most
reasonable .... " Id. at 146 (emphasis added). Similarly, in United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975), the Court held that a patrol officer near the Mexican
border could stop a car "briefly" if he possessed reasonable articulable suspicion that
illegal aliens were inside. Furthermore, Justice Brennan had succinctly stated that:
"Terry encounters must be brief." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 365 (1983). (Bren-
nan, J., concurring).
27 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 705 (1983). Justice O'Connor stated that
"the Terry exception to the probable-cause requirement is premised on the notion that a
Terry-type stop of the person is substantially less intrusive of a person's liberty interests
than a formal arrest." Id. See also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). In Duna-
way, the Supreme Court specifically held that the detention of the suspect was unconsti-
tutional because it approached the intrusiveness of an arrest. See infra note 101.
28 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
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trained narcotics dog.2 9 The detention of the luggage lasted ap-
proximately ninety minutes.30 Stating that Terry stop limitations ap-
ply to possessions as well as persons, the Court held that the ninety
minute seizure exceeded the permissible length of a Terry deten-
tion.3 1 The majority pointed out, however, that the DEA agents'
failure to inform the suspect of the whereabouts of his luggage and
what arrangements would be made for its return were circumstances
that also influenced its decision.32
Writing for the majority in Place, Justice O'Connor produced
seemingly varied perspectives for interpreting the scope of Terry
stops. Initially, Justice O'Connor stated that the nature and extent
of a Terry stop must be "minimally intrusive." 33 Justice O'Connor
later suggested, however, that courts should assess the length of a
stop by giving due consideration to whether police diligently pur-
sued their investigation.3 4 Furthermore, in a footnote, she rejected
the American Law Institute's recommendation of a twenty minute
maximum time limit for Terry stops. 3 5 Justice O'Connor reasoned
that such a limitation would unnecessarily restrict the needs of law
29 In Place, law enforcement officials suspected the respondent of illegal drug traffick-
ing at Miami International Airport. The law enforcement officials approached the re-
spondent and began to question him. Although the respondent consented to a search of
his luggage, the law enforcement officials decided to forego the search because the re-
spondent's flight was about to depart. The Miami officials, however, called DEA agents
in New York who were waiting for the respondent at New York's LaGuardia Airport.
After being confronted by the New York agents, the respondent refused to consent to a
search of his luggage. The agents seized the luggage and transported it to Kennedy
Airport where they subjected it to a sniff test by a narcotics detection dog. The dog gave
a positive response to one of the pieces of luggage. 462 U.S. at 698-99.
30 The actual time the DEA agents had possession of the luggage exceeded ninety
minutes. However, ninety minutes elapsed before the drug detection dog reacted posi-
tively to the luggage. Place, 462 U.S. at 699. At that point the DEA agents had probable
cause to arrest.
31 Id. at 710.
32 "We note that here the New York agents knew the time of Place's scheduled arri-
val at LaGuardia, had ample time to arrange for their additional investigation at that
location, and thereby could have minimized the intrusion on respondent's Fourth
Amendment interests." Id. at 709.
33 Id. at 703.
34 Id. at 709.
35 Id. at 709 n. 10. The American Law Institute Code suggests that a law enforce-
ment officials may stop a person "for such period as is reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purposes authorized .... but in no case for more than twenty
minutes." MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 110.1 (1) (Proposed Official
Draft 1975). The reasoning behind this proposal is as follows: "a period of twenty min-
utes should suffice to obtain from the person stopped an identification, to ascertain
whether the person is prepared to cooperate in the investigation, to check headquarters,
and to determine what further action to take. A period greatly in excess of twenty min-
utes would be much harder to justify on the comparatively informal basis of the stop. It




III. THE FACTS IN SHARPE
In the morning hours of June 9, 1978, DEA Agent Luther
Cooke was patroling the coast of North and South Carolina for pos-
sible drug trafficking.3 7 "At approximately 6:30 A.M., Cooke no-
ticed a pickup truck with an attached camper shall." 3 8 The pickup
travelled closely behind a Pontiac Bonneville and Cooke surmised
that the two vehicles were travelling together.3 9 Because the pickup
was riding low in the rear and did not bounce appreciably in re-
sponse to bumps and curves, Cooke believed that it was transport-
ing a heavy load. 40 Furthermore, Cooke observed that quilted
material covered the rear window.4'
Becoming suspicious, Cooke followed the vehicles south for
twenty miles and then decided to make an "investigative stop." 42
He radioed a dispatch for assistance to which South Carolina High-
way Patrol Officer Kenneth Thrasher responded.43 After the two
officers followed the suspects for several more miles, Cooke radioed
to Thrasher to pull over both vehicles. 44
Thrasher entered the left most lane of the three southbound
lanes, drove up alongside the Pontiac, and motioned the driver to
pull over.45 As the automobile began to pull off the road, the pickup
truck cut between the Pontiac and the patrol car, nearly hitting Of-
ficer Thrasher's vehicle. 46 Thrasher followed the truck as it contin-
ued southbound while Cooke stopped the Pontiac.47
term 'brief time' is vague." MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 283 (Pro-
posed Official Draft 1975).
36 Place, 462 U.S. at 709.




40 Id. at 1571.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. Officer Thrasher was operating a marked patrol car. Id.
44 Id. During the several mile stretch, the pickup and the Pontiac pulled off the high-
way onto a campground road. Agent Cooke and Thrasher followed the two vehicles as
they sped through the campsite at speeds approaching up to sixty miles an hour. All
four vehicles subsequently returned to the highway. Id.
45 Id. Officer Thrasher put on his flashing light during this time. Id.
46 Id. In its description of the facts, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit did not mention that one of the suspects nearly hit Officer Thrasher's
vehicle and continued southbound. See Sharpe v. United States, 660 F.2d 967, 968 (4th
Cir. 1981).
47 Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. at 1570.
[Vol. 761008
1985] REASONABLE LENGTH OF A TERRY STOP
Cooke approached the Pontiac, identified himself and re-
quested a driver's license from the operator who police later identi-
fied as respondent William Sharpe.48 Cooke then attempted to
radio Thrasher to see if he had successfully stopped the pickup.49
Unable to contact Thrasher, Cooke radioed to local police for assist-
ance.50 The police arrived in approximately ten minutes.5 1 Cooke
subsequently departed to join Thrasher who was about one-half
mile down the road.52
In the interim, Thrasher had stopped the truck.55 After search-
ing, respondent Donald Savage and asking for identification and car
registration, Thrasher informed him that he would be held until the
arrival of Agent Cooke.54 In response, Savage requested the return
of his license and indicated that he wanted to leave. 55 Thrasher de-
nied his requests.56
Approximately fifteen minutes after Thrasher stopped the
truck, Agent Cooke arrived. 57 Cooke identified himself as a DEA
agent and examined Savage's driver's license and the truck's bill of
sale.58 Twice Cooke asked permission to search the camper.5 9 In
both instances Savage refused. 60 Cooke then approached the rear
of the truck, stepped on the bumper and noticed that it only sank
slightly.6 1 He then put his nose to the window of the camper and
stated that he could smell marijuana.62 Without Savage's permis-
48 Id. The license bore the name of RaymondJ. Pavlovich. Id. Sharpe had an addi-
tional passenger in the car. At no time did Officer Cooke tell either respondent Sharpe
or the passenger why they had been stopped. Sharpe, 660 F.2d at 968-69.
49 Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. at 1571.
50 Id.
51 Id. Agent Cooke turned over custody of respondent Sharpe and the passenger to
the officers from the Myrtle Beach Police Department. Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. "After stopping the truck, Thrasher had approached it with his revolver drawn,
ordered the driver, Savage, to get out and assume a 'spread eagled' position against the
side of the truck .... " Id.
54 Savage produced his own Florida driver's license, but did not produce a registra-
tion for the truck. Savage, however, did produce a bill of sale for the truck. The name
on the bill of sale was Pavlovich. Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. Thrasher stated that Savage was under custodial arrest and that he could retain
respondent Savage because of speeding charges. Sharpe, 660 F.2d at 969.
57 Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. at 1571.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. Savage's rationale for refusing was that he was not the owner of the truck. Id.
at 1571-72.
61 Id. at 1572.
62 Id. Savage requested Officer Thrasher's opinion once Agent Cooke declared that
he smelled marijuana. Id. at 1572, 1590 n.18. The Fourth Circuit stated that the smell
of raw marijuana gives an officer probable cause for a search. Sharpe, 660 F.2d at 971.
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sion, Cooke took the keys from the truck, opened the camper, and
searched the inside. 63 He discovered a number of highly com-
pressed burlap bales similar to bales of marijuana that he had ob-
served in previous investigations. 64 Cooked then placed respondent
Savage under arrest.65 Returning to the Pontiac, Cooke also ar-
rested respondent Sharpe. 66
Cooke and Thrasher transported the vehicles and parties to the
Myrtle Beach Police Station.67 That evening, DEA agents took the
truck to the Federal Building in South Carolina.68 Several days
later, without a search warrant, Cooke had DEA agents unload the
truck and perform chemical tests on the contents of the bales. 69
The results of the tests indicated that the bales were indeed
marijuana. 70
Sharpe and Savage were charged under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
and 18 U.S.C. § 2 for possession of marijuana with the intent to dis-
tribute.71 The defendants filed a motion to suppress certain evi-
dence as the product of unlawful searches and seizures. 72 The
United States District Court for the District of South Carolina de-
nied the motion and found the defendants guilty as charged. 73
IV. THE DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit re-
63 Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. at 1572.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. Approximately thirty to forty minutes had passed between the initial stop of
respondent Sharpe and his subsequent arrest. Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. The Federal Building was located in Charleston, South Carolina. Id.
69 Id. The truck contained forty-three bales with a combined weight of 2,523
pounds. Cooke had eight bales randomly selected and opened. Id. Cooke kept two of
the eight bales as evidence. The remainder, under the supervision of the Assistant
United States Attorney, were destroyed by fire. Sharpe, 660 F.2d at 969.
70 Id.
71 Id. Section 841(a)(1) of Title 21 of the United States Code states that "[e]xcept as
authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly of intention-
ally-(l) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture,
distribute or dispense, a controlled substance .. " 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1982). Sec-
tion 2(a) of Title 18 of the United States Code states that "[w]hoever commits an offense
against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its
commission is punishable as a principal." 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1982). Section 2(b) states
that "[w]hoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or
another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal." 18
U.S.C. § 2(b) (1982).
72 Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. at 1572.
73 Id.
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versed the District Court's conviction on two grounds. 74 First, the
court stated that the fifteen to twenty minute detention of respon-
dent Savage and the thirty to forty minute detention of respondent
Sharpe violated the brevity requirement for Tery stops. 75 The
length of those detentions transformed them into defacto arrets.76
Since the officers made these defacto arrests without probable cause
the court stated that the evidence obtained from the illegal deten-
tion should have been suppressed.77 Second, the court stated that
irrespective of its first argument, Cooked needed a warrant before
supervising the search and analysis of the truck's contents several
days after the actual stop.78 Cooke's failure to obtain a warrant ren-
dered the search unlawful. 79 Therefore, the court once again con-
cluded that the corresponding evidence of the bales of marijuana
should have been excluded.80
The Government petitioned for certiorari. The Supreme Court
granted the petition and vacated the circuit court's judgment.8 ' The
Supreme Court further remanded the case of the circuit court for
reconsideration in light of its recent decision in United States v.
Ross,8 2 which expanded the scope of probable cause searches.8 3
74 Sharpe, 660 F.2d at 973.
75 Id. at 970. "The stops and detention in this case cannot be described as brief:
Sharpe was detained without probable cause for arrest for thirty to forty minutes before
Cooke returned to the Pontiac to arrest him, and Savage was held under custodial arrest
for at least fifteen minutes before being questioned and finally arrested by Cooke." Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 970-71. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied
the test established in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). In Wong Sun, the
Supreme Court stated that, given the fact that law enforcement officials have illegally
infringed on a suspect's constitutional rights, evidence incriminating the suspect will be
admissible depending on whether it was obtained primarily as the result of the illegal
action or whether it was obtained by means sufficiently distinguishable from the illegal-
ity. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488. Only evidence obtained by the latter means is admissi-
ble. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated that Agent
Cooke would not have had the chance to smell the marijuana if not for the extended
illegal detection. Sharpe, 660 F.2d at 971.
78 Sharpe, 660 F.2d at 971-72. The Court based its decision on Robbins v. California,
453 U.S. 420 (1981). In Robbins, highway patrol officers stopped the petitioner for driv-
ing erratically. After smelling marijuana, the officers searched the vehicle finding two
packages wrapped in opaque green plastic. Without a warrant, the officers opened the
packages, discovering marijuana. Robbins, 453 U.S. at 422. The Supreme Court re-
versed the court of appeals' conviction and held that a dosed container in an automobile
cannot be opened without a search warrant. Id. at 428-29.
79 Sharpe, 660 F.2d at 972.
80 Id.
81 United States v. Sharpe, 457 U.S. 1127 (1982).
82 456 U.S. 798 (1982). In Ross, acting on an informant's disdosure, police stopped a
vehicle driven by a suspected narcotics dealer. In conducting a search of the car, police
officers opened a brown bag and zippered leather pouch, finding heroin inside. Id. at
800-01. Reversing the court of appeals' decision, the Court held that when law enforce-
1985] 1011
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On remand, the court of appeals upheld its earlier decision.8 4
The majority stated that in light of Ross' expansion, the absence of a
warrant did not render Cooke's search and subsequent analysis of
the contents of the truck unconstitutional.8 5 The majority, however,
maintained its alternative argument that the original detention of
the respondents failed to satisfy the brevity requirement of a Terry
stop.8 6 As such, the court of appeals held that the police illegally
arrested respondents Savage and Sharpe and that the evidence ob-
tained from this arrest should be suppressed.8 7 The Supreme Court
once again granted certiorari.88
V. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The majority8 9 initiated its discussion of Sharpe by reiterating
the standards of a reasonable stop expounded in Terry.90 First, a law
enforcement official initially must be able to justify the stop.91 The
officer must have an "articulable and reasonable suspicion." 92 Sec-
ond, the scope of the stop must be reasonable under the given con-
ditions. 93 The majority stated that the court of appeals assumed
that Cooke had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that respon-
dents Sharpe and Savage were involved in the trafficking of contra-
band.94 The majority concluded that the record supported this
assumption.95
In determining if the scope of the stop was reasonable given the
particular situation, the majority limited its inquiry to the detention
ment agents have probable cause to search a vehicle, the entire vehicle, including pack-
ages and containers therein, is subject to the search. Id. at 825.
83 Sharpe, 457 U.S. 1127 (1982).
84 United States v. Sharpe, 712 F.2d 65 (4th Cir. 1983).
85 Id.
86 Id. "Finding that Ross does not adversely effect our primary holding that the initial
stop of the vehicle and the lengthy detention of the two defendants constituted an illegal
seizures, we readopt the majority opinion as modified herein ...." Id.
87 Id.
88 104 S. Ct. 3531 (1984).
89 ChiefJustice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices Powell,
Rehnquist and O'Connor joined.
90 Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. at 1573.
91 Id.
92 Id. (relying on Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. The majority stated without further discussion: "That assumption [i.e., that
Officer Thrasher and Agent Cooke possessed reasonable articulate suspicion] is abun-
dantly supported by the record." Id.
1012 [Vol. 76
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of the driver of the pickup truck.96 The majority recognized that the
respondents wanted to suppress evidence of the marijuana.97 The
majority therefore reasoned that Sharpe's detention was irrelevant
to the determination of this exclusion because the police discovered
the marijuana only in the pickup driven by Savage.98
In analyzing Savage's detention, the majority concluded that
Agent Cooke's actions were indeed reasonable given the particular
circumstances. 99 The length of the detention did not transform it
from an investigative search into a defacto arrest. 10 0 The majority
distinguished its prior decisions in Dunaway v. New York, 101 Florida v.
Royer,' 0 2 and United States v. Place10 3 from the facts in Sharpe.'0 4 The
majority stated that in both Dunaway and Royer, where the respon-
dents' motions to suppress illegally obtained evidence were upheld,
the Court focused on the events that occurred during the respon-
dents' detentions and not on the length of these detentions. 10 5 In
addition, the majority concluded that the underlying rationale in
Place primarily involved the failure of law enforcement officials to
diligently pursue their investigation. 10 6 Therefore, the majority re-
jected the idea that its previous decisions precluded the validity of a
twenty minute Teny stop.
Furthermore, the majority rejected the possibility of establish-
ing a maximum time limit for investigative stops. In protecting law
enforcement interests, the majority reasoned that law enforcement
96 Id. at 1574. "It is not necessary for us to decide whether the length of Sharpe's
detention was unreasonable, because that detention bears no causal relation to Agent
Cooke's discovery of marijuana." Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 1576.
100 Id.
101 442 U.S. 200 (1979). In Dunaway, police received information that was insufficient
to obtain a warrant for the suspect's arrest. Nevertheless, police detained the suspect,
took him to police headquarters and interrogated him. Subsequent to the questioning,
the suspect made incriminating statements. The Supreme Court reversed the lower
court's decision and upheld the petitioner's motion to suppress the evidence. Id. at 219.
102 460 U.S. 491 (1983). In Royer, the respondent, who was preparing to board a
plane to New York City from Miami International Airport, fit the classic "drug-courier
profile." After asking for identification and finding a discrepancy, detectives took re-
spondent to a small room for further questioning. Without giving consent to a search,
respondent unlocked one of his suitcases which contained marijuana. In upholding the
respondent's bid to suppress the evidence, the Court held that the extent of the investi-
gation was too intrusive. Id at 507-08.
103 See infra text accompanying notes 28-36.
104 Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. at 1574.
105 In discussing Royer, the majority stated: "As in Dunaway, though, the focus was
primarily on facts other than the duration of the defendant's detention-particularly the
fact that the police confined the defendant in a small airport room for questioning." Id.
106 Id. at 1575.
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agents must have sufficient flexibility to respond to the demands of
particular situations.' 0 7 Thus, the majority stated: "Much as a
'bright-line rule would be desirable, in evaluating whether an inves-
tigative detention is unreasonable, common sense and ordinary
human experience must govern over rigid criteria."' 08
In lieu of a precise time limit, the majority established a dili-
gence test to determine whether the duration of a detention is too
long.10 9 The majority held that the length of a stop is reasonable as
long as law enforcement officials diligently employ methods of inves-
tigation that will "confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly." 110
The majority further emphasized that the mere existence of a less
intrusive investigative approach does not mean that a particular de-
tention of an individual constitutes an illegal seizure."' Only if law
enforcement officials act unreasonably in failing to recognize or fol-
low the less intrusive method would employment of a more intrusive
method be unconstitutional. 1 2 The majority also added that the
swiftness with which a situation develops must be taken into account
to determine the reasonableness of an officer's actions. 113
The majority therefore concluded that the facts in Sharpe did
not reveal any unnecessary delays in the investigation. 14 The ma-
jority emphasized that the respondent caused the ten to fifteen min-
ute delay by cutting between the Pontiac and Officer Thrasher's
patrol car.115 Furthermore, Agent Cooke attempted to contact Of-
ficer Thrasher and diligently carried out his investigation of both
respondents Sharpe and Savage. 116 In light of this diligence, the
majority held that the twenty minute stop of respondent Savage was






11 Id. at 1576. The majority was concerned with the Court's prior statement in Royer
that the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably
available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time." Royer, 460
U.S. at 500.
112 Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. at 1576. "The question is not simply whether some other alter-
native was available, but whether the police acted unreasonably in failing to recognize or







REASONABLE LENGTH OF A TERRY STOP
B. JUSTICE MARSHALL'S CONCURRENCE IN THE JUDGMENT
Justice Marshall rejected the majority's opinion for two reasons.
First, Justice Marshall contended that the majority clearly belittled
the brevity requirement for Tery stops. 118 Relying on Dunaway v.
New York and United States v. Place, Justice Marshall asserted that a
legally valid Terry stop must satisfy two criteria. 1 9 The intrusion on
the individual must be minimal and the law enforcement interest
must outweigh the privacy interests that the stop violates. 120 Justice
Marshall further stated that the length of the stop "in and of itself"
can produce a level of intrusiveness that can only be supported by
probable cause.121 He concluded that this observation was consis-
tent with previous Supreme Court decisions that stated that Terry
stops be brief.122
Justice Marshall recognized three pragmatic considerations for
adhering to the requirement that Terry stops be brief regardless of
law enforcement interests. First, adherence to the brevity require-
ment would force law enforcement agents to use the least intrusive
means to complete an investigation. 123 Second, a strict application
of the brevity requirement would establish an objective standard so
that courts would not have to vary their determination of "reasona-
bleness" on the basis of what law enforcement resources were avail-
able to the officer. 12 4 Moreover, with an objective- standard, courts
would not have to analyze whether alternative investigative methods
ought to have been employed.' 25 Third, a strict brevity requirement
would eliminate inconsistent and confusing decisions that would re-
118 Id. "I write separately, however, because in my view the Court understates the
importance of Terry' brevity requirement to the constitutionality of Terry stops." Id. at
1577. Justice Blackmun also filed a brief concurring opinion. Prior to the grant for
certiorari for the case, respondents Sharpe and Savage became fugitives. Justice Black-
mun stated that he would have vacated the Court of Appeals' decision on this basis




122 Id. Justice Marshall cited United States v. Hensley, 105 S. Ct. 575 (1985) ("A de-
tention might well be so lengthy or intrusive as to exceed the permissible limits of a Terry
stop"), as well as Royer, 460 U.S. at 500 ("[Ain investigative detention must be tempo-
rary."), among others in footnote 1.
123 Id. at 1579.
124 Id. at 1580. Justice Marshall stated: "And if due diligence takes as fixed the
amount of resources a community is willing to devote to law enforcement, officials in
one community may act with due diligence in holding an individual at an airport for 35
minutes while waiting for the sole narcotics detection dog they possess, while officials
who have several dogs readily available may be dilatory in prolonging an airport stop
even 10 minutes .... Constitutional rights should not vary in this manner." Id.
125 Id. at 1579.
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sult from a subjective standard.' 26 Justice Marshall stated that these
decisions would produce "'friction and resentment'" between po-
lice and the courts.127
Justice Marshall recognized that the Supreme Court had not yet
had the opportunity to explicitly specify the outer limits of a permis-
sible investigative stop. 128 As such, Justice Marshall established his
own standards. He asserted that any stop that lasts longer than the
time necessary to obtain the suspect's identification, ask questions
and perform a brief frisk produces the presumption of a de facto
arrest. 129 However, this presumption may be dissipated if it is
shown that the extended detention was not unduly intrusive. 130 Jus-
tice Marshall conceded that one situation in which an extended stop
is not unduly intrusive is when the suspect causes the prolonged
detention.' 3 ' Justice Marshall, however, rejected the notion that a
stop can be extended solely because law enforcement needs man-
date additional time.13 2
Nonetheless, Justice Marshall found that the facts of the case
made the majority's ultimate judgment acceptable.' 33 Once Agent
Cooke caught up with Officer Thrasher and respondent Savage, the
investigation took only several minutes. He concluded that because
respondent Savage's own evasive action caused the initial ten to fif-
teen minute delay the investigative stop was not unduly intrusive
and therefore, did not violate Savages's constitutional rights. 34
In addition to placing greater importance on the brevity re-
quirement than the majority, Justice Marshall also wrote separately
because he felt that the majority decided whether Agent Cooke had
reasonable suspicion without a sufficiently developed factual rec-
ord. 13 5 Justice Marshall attacked the majority's conclusion that the
126 Id. at 1580.
127 Id. at 1580 (quoting, Schwartz, Stop and Frisk, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 443, 439
(1967)). The friction and resentment thatJustice Marshall referred to is based, in part,
on the shame a policeman would experience among his colleagues for having over-
stepped the bounds of permissible police action. Without a clear cut standard, police
officers have to balance the varying interests. Similarly, in the absence of an objective
standard, courts may be fickle in deciding these balancing cases. Thus, although an
officer may think he has acted reasonably, a court may decide otherwise. Id. See
Schwartz, Stop and Frisk, 58 CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 443, 449 (1967).




132 Id. In addition, Justice Marshall rejected the American Law Institute's suggestion
that the maximum time limit of a Terry stop be 20 minutes. Id.
133 Id. at 1582.
134 Id.
'35 Id. at 1582-83.
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record "'abundantly'" supported the court of appeals' assumption
that the detention of respondents Sharpe and Savage was initially
justified.136 Injustice Marshall's view, the limited factual record did
not clearly establish that Agent Cooke had the necessary reasonable
suspicion to stop the respondents. 137
C. JUSTICE BRENNAN'S DISSENT
Justice Brennan dissented from the majority's opinion for the
following reasons: 1) the facts of the case as stated by the majority
indicated that the detention of Savage and Sharp should not have
been determined by Teny stop criteria; 2) the majority made a "de
novo" factual determination when it stated that Savage attempted to
elude Officer Thraser; and 3) the majority failed to apply the prece-
dential requirements of previous Terry cases.' 3 8 Justice Brennan
recognized that flight from law enforcement officials, in conjunction
with pre-existing suspicion, is a fact that generally elevates an of-
ficer's reasonable suspicion to a level of probable cause.' 3 9 There-
fore, he reasoned that if one accepted the majority's interpretation
of the facts, respondent Savage's evasion of Officer Thrasher would
have given Thrasher probable cause to arrest. 140 Under these cir-
cumstances the majority did not have to apply Teny principles be-
cause the detention was a legal arrest.
However, Justice Brennan stated that the record was unclear as
136 Id. Justice Marshall stated several reasons for attacking the majority's conclusion.
First, the court of appeals did not consider evidence presented to the district court
showing the density of pickup trucks in the area. Part of Officer Cooke's reasonable
articulable suspicion was based on the type of vehicle respondent Savage was operating.
Second, Justice Marshall denied the implication that the respondents were trying to
evade police when they sped through the campground road See supra note 44. Finally,
Justice Marshall contended that the district court was improperly influenced by the fact
that four or five other similar stops were made that morning. He stated that the Court
used this information when it decided whether Agent Cooke had reasonable articulable
suspicion. Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. at 1582-83.
137 Id. at 1584.
138 Id. at 1585-93. Justice Stevens also dissented. His dissent, however, like Justice
Blackmun's concurrence, see supra note 118, centered on the fugitive status of the re-
spondents. Stevens stated that the appeal involving a fugitive respondent should be
dismissed because the absence of one of the parties produces the risk that the adver-
sarial process of the courts will not function properly. Id. at 1594-97.
139 Id. at 1585. Justice Brennan relied on Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968),
among other cases, to support his point. In Sibron, the Court stated "deliberately furtive
actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens
tea, and when coupled with specific knowledge on the part of the officer relating the
suspect to the evidence of crime, they are proper factors to be considered in the decision
to make an arrest." Sibron, 392 U.S. at 66-67.
140 Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. at 1586.
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to whether Savage's actions actually constituted an evasion.1 41 Jus-
tice Brennan supported this idea by recognizing that Officer
Thrasher gave only an inconclusive response when questioned
about Savage's "evasive" efforts at trial. 142 Based on the ambiguity
of the record, Brennan stated that the majority's assumption that
Savage purposely evaded law enforcement officials was an exercise
in fact finding.1 43
Moreover, Justice Brennan claimed that the majority failed to
recognize the precedential directives presented by the Terry line of
cases.144 He stated that the brevity requirement is an "important
constitutional safeguard" that the majority disregarded.145 Further-
more, he emphasized that according to the decision in Florida v.
Royer, the government bears the burden of showing that law en-
forcement agents used the least intrusive methods reasonably avail-
able to complete the investigation. 146 Justice Brennan concluded
that the majority ignored these requirements by adopting a less
stringent standard than the brevity requirement.' 47
VI. ANALYSIS
A. TWO TESTS FOR DETERMINING IF THE LENGTH OF A TERRY STOP IS
REASONABLE
In Sharpe, Justice Marshall and the majority produced two dif-
ferent tests for evaluating whether, in the absence of probable
cause, the length of a seizure is reasonable. Justice Marshall advo-
cated an intrusiveness-brevity test. Under this test courts would ul-
timately decide whether the length of a detention was "minimally
intrusive" on an individual's privacy rights.' 48 A court would deter-
mine whether a stop was exceedingly intrusive by applying a strict
brevity requirement. This brevity requirement would demand that
an investigative stop be only so long as is necessary to reasonably
141 Id. at 1587.
142 Id. Defense counsel asked "Would you say the pickup truck was attempting to
allude [sic) you or just passed you by thinking you had stopped the car?" Thrasher re-
sponded, "[W]ell I was across ... partially in two lanes and he got by me in the other
lane .... " Id.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 1588-89.
145 Id. at 1592-93.
146 Id. at 1589.
147 Id. at 1593. "The Court today has evaded these [precedential] requirements,
failed even to acknowledge the evidence of bungling, miscommunication, and reason-
able investigative alternatives and pronounced simply that the individual officers 'acted
diligently.'" Id.
148 Id. at 1578.
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question, identify and, if necessary, frisk an individual.' 49 Typically,
this time entails several minutes.' 50 Courts would consider those
stops within this time limit to be minimally intrusive and, therefore,
valid Terry stops. However, courts would make the presumption
that those stops exceeding this time limit are no longer minimally
intrusive. Unless the state could rebut this presumption, the court
would consider the detention to be an illegal arrest.
One instance whereby the state could rebut the presumption
that a detention is excessively intrusive is when the suspect himself
causes the extended length of the stop. In applying the intrusive-
ness-brevity test, Justice Marshall stated that respondent Savage's
own evasive actions caused the twenty minute delay, thereby rebut-
ting the presumption that the detention was overly intrusive.151
Thus, under the intrusiveness-brevity tests, courts that find a sus-
pect extended his own detention would hold that the length of the
stop did not violate that individual's fourth amendment rights.
In contrast, the majority in Sharpe recommended that a dili-
gence test should determine the reasonableness of the length of a
Terry stop.152 Under the diligence test, courts must decide whether
an officer was diligently investigating the source of his reasonable
suspicion. 53 Normally, as long as a law enforcement agent actively
pursues a reasonable investigative method to dispel his reasonable
suspicion, courts will consider the length of the stop to be within the
directives of the fourth amendment.' 54 Even under this test, how-
ever, courts must still keep in mind that an overly extended investi-
gative stop is an illegal defacto arrest. 55 Thus, if an officer detains an
149 Id. at 1581.
150 Id. "I agree that Terry ' brevity requirement is not to be judged by a stopwatch but
rather by the facts of particular stops. At the same time, the time it takes to 'briefly stops
[the] person, ask questions, or check identification,' United States v. Henseley, and, if war-
ranted, to conduct a brief pat-down for weapons, see Terry, is typically just a few min-
utes." Id.
'5' Id.
152 Id. at 1575. See supra text accompanying notes 109-10.
153 "In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an
investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently
pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm their suspicions quickly ....
Id.
154 Id. In supportings its position, the majority cited a footnote in Michigan v. Sum-
mers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981). The footnote states: "Professor LaFave has noted that the
reasonableness of a detention may be determined in party by 'whether the police are
diligently pursuing a means of investigation which is likely to resolve the matter one way
or another very soon .... ' 3 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.2, 40 (1976)." Sum-
mers, 452 U.S. at 701 n.14. The majority in Sharpe appeared to base its theory primarily
on the plan delineated by Professor LaFave. 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.2(f),
35-44 (1978). (hereinafter cited as SEARCH AND SEIZURE).
155 Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. at 1575. See also Place, 462 U.S. at 710.
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individual: 1) without actively pursuing a viable investigative
method to either confirm or dispel his suspicion, or 2) after his sus-
picion ha- been dispelled, or 3) for an extensively long period of
time, an illegal arrest has taken place. 156
B. THE DILIGNCE TEST AND STRICT TIME LIMITATIONS
In adopting the diligence standard, the Sharpe majority empha-
sized the Supreme Court's previous reluctance to establish a rigid
time limitation on Terry stops. The majority justified this emphasis
by referring to United States v. Place, where the Supreme Court re-
jected the American Law Institute's suggested twenty minute maxi-
mum for Terry detentions. 157 The rationale underlying this rejection
was that a rigid time limit would not provide law enforcement offi-
cials with the flexibility necessary to respond to a variety of situa-
tions. The Place majority commented: "Such a limit would
undermine the equally important need to allow authorities to gradu-
ate their responses to the demands of any particular situation." 158
Thus, by referring to the Supreme Court's reasoning in Place, the
Sharpe majority ultimately focussed on the need for flexibility in es-
tablishing a test to determine the proper limits on the duration of a
Terry stop.
By comparison, the diligence test provides much greater flexi-
bility to law enforcement officials than Justice Marshall's intrusive-
ness-brevity test. One situation which clearly highlights this
difference is when a police official's reasonable suspicion increases
subsequent to the initial stop. Under the diligence test, if the sus-
pect's explanation of the situation is questionable or is known to be
false, thus increasing the level of reasonable suspicion, the officer
has the authority to continue the investigation. 159 Under the intru-
156 Although the situation where an officer's suspicion is dispelled is not addressed by
the majority in Sharpe, it naturally follows from Terry standards. Once an officer's rea-
sonable suspicion is dispelled, he no longer has the level of suspicion which originally
justified the stop. In State v. Watson, 165 Conn. 577, 345 A.2d 532 (1973), cert denied,
416 U.S. 960 (1974), the Supreme Court of Connecticut stated: "The results of the ini-
tial stop may arouse further suspicion or may dispel the questions in the officer's mind.
If the latter is the case, the stop may go no further and the detained individual must be
free to go." Id. at 585, 345 A.2d at 537. The court however ultimately decided that the
detention of four men suspected of robbing a hotel room was a reasonable detention
under the fourth amendment. Id. at 586-91, 345 A.2d at 538-39.
157 See supra note 35.
158 Place, 462 U.S. at 709 n.10.
159 See Harris v. United States, 382 A.2d 1016 (1978). In Harris, two police officers
observed the appellant walking from a parking lot with a guitar case and a tape deck.
One of the officers was aware of the high incidence of auto thefts in the area. The
officers stopped the appellant and asked for identification. The appellant stated that his
identification vas in "his car." When the officers and the appellant arrived at the car,
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siveness-brevity test, however, increasing reasonable suspicion
would not affect what constitutes a reasonable length of a stop.
Although an officer's level of suspicion could reach probable cause
if the officer had the opportunity to obtain additional information,
the intrusiveness-brevity test would require the officer to terminate
the detention once the reasonable time limit has expired. Justice
Marshall acknowledged this difficulty when he stated, "[D]ifficult
questions will no doubt be presented when during these few min-
utes an officer learns enough to increase his suspicions but not
enough to establish probable cause." 160 Thus, the diligence test, as
opposed to the intrusiveness-brevity test, conforms with the
Supreme Court's rationale for refusing to establish a strict time limi-
tation on Teny stops.
C. THE ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE DILIGENCE STANDARD
Although the diligence test corresponds to the Supreme
Court's rejection of a rigid time limitation, the Sharpe majority
presented no other justification for advocating this standard. More-
over, by adopting the diligence standard the majority interpreted
the second prong of the Terry test to include balancing the govern-
ment's interest in law enforcement against an individual's fourth
amendment rights. The majority explicitly demonstrated this bal-
ancing practice when it weighed the relative importance of the brev-
ity requirement against law enforcement concerns. The majority
stated:
While it is clear that the brevity of the invasion of the individual's
Fourth Amendment interest is an important factor in determining
whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on
the appellant stated that his wife had dropped him off and that without the keys he was
unable to enter the vehicle. The appellant suggested that the officers take him to two
other locations where other persons could verify his explanation. After the appellant
was unable to get someone to verify his story at the first location, the officers temporarily
stopped at a restaurant. During further questioning by one of the officers, the appellant
admitted that he had stolen the property. Id. at 1017-18. In holding that the twenty-five
minute detention of the appellant was constitutional the court stated that "where the
facts ascertained during such an encounter gradually escalate toward probable cause,
reasonable extension of the duration of the stop to await the outcome of further police
investigation is justified." Id. at 1019. See also SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 9.2(f) at 39. Pro-
fessor LaFave states: "Thus, if a person is stopped on suspicion that he has just engaged
in criminal activity, but the suspect identifies himself satisfactorily and investigation es-
tablishes that no offense has occurred, there is no basis for further detention, and the
suspect must be released. On the other hand, if the suspect's explanation needs to be
checked out, and in particular if his explanation is known to be false in some respects,
there is reason to continue the detention somewhat longer while the investigation con-
tinues." Id. (footnotes omitted).
160 105 S. Ct. at 1581.
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reasonable suspicion, we have emphasized the need to consider the
law enforcement purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time
reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes.' 6 '
Underlying this interpretation of the second prong of the Terry
test is the implicit assumption that the scope of an individual's
fourth amendment rights may vary and that courts should define the
scope of these rights by focusing on law enforcement needs. Justice
Marshall pointed out that under the diligence standard an individ-
ual's constitutional rights are dependent on the interests of law en-
forcement.1 6 2 Courts will consider the validity of a Terry stop by
examining the actions of police rather than the actual intrusion on
the detainee. 16 3 Thus, as long as police are diligently pursuing an
investigation, the length of a stop can vary significantly despite the
fact that large increases in the length of the detention substantially
increase the infringement on the suspect's fourth amendment
rights.
This interpretation of the Terry test and its underlying assump-
tion are contrary to the rationale developed in the Terry line of cases.
First, the majority in Terry applied a balancing test exclusively to the
first part of its two pronged test, i.e., to determine whether the
search was initially justified. 164 The Terry majority did not balance
the law enforcement interest against the individual's fourth amend-
ment rights when it considered whether the scope of non-probable
cause searches were reasonable. 65 In applying a balancing test to
the first prong of its test, the Terry majority demonstrated that non-
probable cause searches were only permissible in a limited group of
situations. Moreover, the Terry majority's election not to apply a
balancing criterion to the second prong of its test demonstrated the
Supreme Court's desire to strictly limit the scope of non-probable
cause detentions. Although the Terry majority recognized the need
to allow non-probable cause searches when police safety was at
stake, the majority was not willing to allow the scope of these
searches to vary in response to the government's law enforcement
needs.
Likewise, in cases subsequent to Teny, the Supreme Court
maintained a strict limitation on the scope of Terry stops despite a
substantial change in the initial justifications and purpose of non-
161 Id. at 1575 (citations omitted).
162 Id. at 1580.
163 Id.
164 Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-27.
165 See Dunway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209-10 (1979) (Justice Brennan discussed
the limited number of situations in which Teny dententions are permissible).
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probable cause detentions. In Terry, the initial justification for a
search without probable cause was to ensure police safety. 166 How-
ever, inAlmeida-Sanchez v. United States ' 67 and United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce168 the Supreme Court expanded the initial justification for
Terry stops to include the prevention of illegal immigration. Simi-
larly, in Florida v. Royer 169 the Supreme Court again expanded the
field of Terry stop justifications. The Royer Court acknowledged the
possible validity of Terry stops intended to detect trafficking in illegal
narcotics. 170 By moving from Terry to Royer the Supreme Court
changed the perspective of Terry stops from an exclusively protec-
tive function to an investigative role. Under the second prong of the
Terry test, the scope of the stop should be reasonably related to the
stop's initial justification. 17 1 However, notwithstanding the fact that
a detention aimed at the discovery and accumulation of evidence
requires a substantially greater amount of time than a protective
search, the Supreme Court refused to recognize a significant expan-
sion in the scope of Terry stops. 1 7 2 Rather, the Supreme Court ad-
166 Terry, 392 U.S. at 29.
167 413 U.S. 266 (1973). In Almeida-Sanchez, the Supreme Court considered whether a
United States Boarder Patrol officer could stop a suspect near the Mexican boarder with-
out reasonable suspicion. The Court reversed the court of appeals judgment recogniz-
ing the validity of such random stops. Id. at 275. Justice Powell, however, in his
concurrence recognized that under appropriate limiting circumstances the govern-
ment's interest in curbing illegal immigration may produce the equivalent of probable
cause. Id. at 279.
168 422 U.S. 873 (1975). In Brignoni-Ponce, a United States Boarder Patrol agent
stopped a car and questioned the occupants about their citizenship. The agent's only
justification for making the stop was that the occupants of the vehicle appeared to be of
Mexican ancestry. Id. at 874-75. Despite holding that the agent did not possess the
reasonable suspicion necessary to make the stop, the Court recognized the validity of
Terry detentions intended to detect illegal immigration. The Court stated: "In this case
as well, because of the importance of the governmental interest at stake, the minimal
intrusion of a brief stop and the absence of practical alternatives for policing the
boarder, we hold that when an officer's observations lead him reasonably to suspect that
a particular vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in the country, he may stop the
car and briefly investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion." Id. at 881.
169 See supra note 102.
170 Royer, 460 U.S. at 498-99. Justice White, writing for the majority, implied that the
Supreme Court's decision that DEA agents illegally detained respondent Royer did not
indicate that all temporary detentions undertaken to suppress illegal drug trafficking
were permissible. Id.
171 Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
172 One frequently cited decision that appears to express the contrary viewpoint in
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 (1980). Justice Stevens, writing for the major-
ity, stated that "the exception for limited intrusions that may be justified by special law
enforcement interests is not confined to the momentary, on-the-street detention accom-
panied by a frisk for weapons involved in Terry and Adams. Id. In the footnote corre-
sponding to the text, however, Justice Stevens' reference to Professor LaFave's
description of permissible investigative techniques indicates thatJustice Stevens was pri-
marily distinguishing the time needed to frisk an individual from the time needed to
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hered to its strict brevity standard. Thus, in Almeida-Sanchez and
Brignoni-Ponce the Court recognized the brief nature of the suspects'
detentions. 173 Similarly, the Royer majority explicitly stated that Terry
stops must be "temporary" and that the "investigative methods em-
ployed should be the least intrusive means reasonably avail-
able. .... ,,174 Therefore, the decision to strictly construe the scope
of Terry stops, despite the opportunity to expand this scope, re-
flected the Supreme Court's emphasis on the protection of an indi-
vidual's fourth amendment rights.
This emphasis with regard to the scope of Terry stops further
implied that courts should consider the intrusiveness of a stop from
the perspective of the detainee. Such a perspective is thoroughly
consistent with the Supreme Court's previous decisions in fourth
amendment cases. In United States v. Mendenhall,175 the Supreme
Court considered the parameters for determining when a "seizure"
takes place. DEA agents approached the suspect at Detroit Metro-
politan Airport and subsequently asked her if she would follow them
to the DEA office for further questioning. 176 Upon her arrival at the
office, the suspect consented to a search of her person and DEA
officials discovered two small packages of heroin. 77 In holding that
the DEA agents had not "seized" the suspect, Justice Stewart stated
that courts should consider whether a reasonable person would
have considered themself free to walk away from law enforcement
officials during their encounter with them. 78 Although Justice
briefly question him. Id. at n.12. Clearly, the latter requires a greater length of time.
Justice Stevens did not reject the brevity requirement as the footnote states: " 'There is
no reason to conclude that any investigative methods of the type just listed are inher-
ently objectionable; they might cast doubt upon the reasonableness of the detention,
however, if their use makes the period of detention unduly long .... . Id. at n.12
(quoting SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 9.2(f) 36-37).
173 In Brignoni-Ponce, Justice Powell emphasized that the intrusion on the suspect was
"modest." Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 880. Furthermore, he stated that the minimal in-
trusion of a brief stop was one of the factors the court considered in determining
whether Terry stops undertaken to detect illegal aliens were permissible. Id. at 881.
174 Royer, 460 U.S. at 500.
175 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
176 Id. at 547-48. The two agents originally asked for the suspect's identification and
airline ticket. The names on the suspect's driver's license and airline ticket were differ-
ent. After questioning the suspect about the discrepancy and the length of her stay in
California, the investigators identified themselves as DEA agents. The suspect subse-
quently became very nervous and had difficulty speaking. Id.
177 Id. at 549.
178 Id. at 554. Only Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Stewart in this portion of his
opinion. Justice Powell, Justice Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger concurred in the
Court's decision that DEA agents had not violated the suspect's fourth amendment
rights. However, they determined that the suspect had in fact been "seized." Id. at 573.
Justice Powell justified the legality of the detention by stating that the DEA agents pos-
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Stewart did not specifically state that courts should view fourth
amendment rights from the perspective of the detainee, by estab-
lishing the reasonable man standard, he clearly avoided establishing
the law enforcement perspective as a controlling criterion.
Moreover, in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,179 the Supreme
Court considered the constitutionality of permitting Boarder Patrol
agents to stop vehicles at a permanent checkpoint near the Mexican
boarder. 180 In holding that reasonable suspicion was not a prerequi-
site for such stops, the court focused its analysis on the detainee's
perception of the seizure.' 8 ' The Court stated that motorists are
much less likely to be frightened or concerned by checkpoint stops
because of the routine and public nature of these detentions. 8 2 As
such, the court stated that these stops were minimally intrusive.18 3
The Court, therefore examined the intrusion from the perspective
of the detainee.
The Supreme Court's initial interpretation of the two prongs of
the Terry test along with its other fourth amendment decisions indi-
cate that the test for determining the reasonable duration of a Terry
stop should consider the intrusiveness of these detentions from the
perspective of the detainee. Justice Marshall's intrusiveness-brevity
test satisfied this requirement. The underlying assumption of the
intrusiveness-brevity test is that an individual's fourth amendment
rights are not variable.' 84 By strictly limiting the length of Terry
stops, the intrusiveness-brevity test minimizes the actual intrusion
on the detainee. This focus on intrusion that the suspect will expe-
rience, as opposed to a focus on the intent and action's of law en-
forcement officials, corresponds to the Supreme Court's earlier
interpretation of Terry detentions.
VII. CONCLUSION
In United States v. Sharpe, the Supreme Court determined the
reasonableness of a twenty minute investigative stop. The majority
sessed reasonable suspicion of illegal activity and that the suspect had voluntarily con-
sented to the search. Id. In a footnote, however, Justice Powell stated that he did not
reject the reasonable man standard, but merely felt that given the facts of the case an
individual would not reasonably have believed that he was free to leave. Id. at 560 n.1.
But see, United States v. Forero-Rincon, 626 F.2d 218, 219 n. 3 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating
that Mendenhall is not controlling because of the lack of a majority view).
179 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
180 Id. at 545.
181 Id. at 558-60.
182 Id. at 558.
183 Id. at 560.
184 Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. at 1580.
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stated that the test used to determine reasonableness is whether the
law enforcement agent diligently pursued the investigation in an ac-
ceptable manner. Justice Marshall, on the other hand, suggested
that a Teny stop is reasonable only if the stop is minimally intrusive
to the detainee. He indicated that intrusiveness should be measured
by an intrusiveness-brevity test.
The majority's adoption of the diligence test satisfied the need
for flexibility in the administration of law enforcement. However,
choosing a standard to determine the reasonable limits of the dura-
tion of a Terry stop on the basis of the needs of law enforcement is
contrary to the underlying intention of Terry v. Ohio. The Terry
Court's refusal to use a balancing test to determine the proper
scope of non-probable cause searches along with the Supreme
Court's subsequent narrow interpretation of the second prong of
the Terry test both indicate the Court's original intention to strictly
limit the duration of Terry stops. Furthermore, a test designed to
limit the intrusion on the suspect's fourth amendment rights must
evaluate this intrusion from the suspect's viewpoint. Because Jus-
tice Marshall's standard strictly limits the actual intrusion on the
suspect's fourth amendment rights, the intrusiveness-brevity test, as
opposed to the diligence test, more appropriately represents the in-
tentions of Terry v. Ohio.
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